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In a world economy there are two types of distortions which can be cauaed by
capital income taxation in addition to the standard closed-economy wedge
between the consumer-saver marginal intertemporal rate of substitution and the
producer-investor marginal productivity of capital: (i)international
differencea in intertemporal marginal rates of substitution, implying an
inefficient allocation of world savings across countries; and (ii)
international differences in the marginal productivity of capital, implying an
inefficient allocation of world investment across countries. The paper focuses
on the structure of taxation for countries which are engaged in tax competition
and on potential gains from s tax harmonization. We show that if the competing
countries sre sufficiently coordinated with the rest of the world then tax
competition leads each country to apply the residence orinciole of taxation and
there are no gains from tax harmonization. If, however there is not sufficient
coordinstion,tax competition leads to low capital income taxes and the tax
burden falls on the internationally immobile factors. The outcome is
nevertheless still efficient relative to the available constrained set of tax
instruments.
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ISRAEL ISRAEL1. Introduction
In a world with international capital nobility, the equality
between saving and investment need not hold for each country separately,
but rather for world aggregate saving and investment. This separation
brings out new issues of taxation in theory and practice. In a closed
econmy a tax on capital income drives just one wedge between the
consumer- saver marginal intertemporal rate of substitution and the
producer-investor marginal productivity of capital. In a world of open
economies there are two more types of distortions which can be caused by
capital income taxation: (i) internationaldifferences in
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution, implying an inefficient
allocation of world savings across countries; (ii) international
differences in the marginal productivity of capital, implying that world
investment is not efficiently allocated across countries.
In an international context, there are two polar principles of
taxation: the residence (of the taxpayer) and the source (of income)principles. According to the first principle, residents are taxed on
their world-wide income equally, regardless of whether the source of the
income is domestic or foreign.' A resident in any country must earn the
same net return on her savings, no matter to which country she chooses
to channel her savings (the rate-of-return arbitrage). If a country
adopts the residence principle, taxing at the same rate capital income
from all sources, then the gross return accruing to an individual in
that country must be the same, regardless of which country is the source
of that return. Thus, the marginal product of capital in that country
will be equal to the world return to capital. If all countries adopt
the residence principle, then capital income taxation does not disturb
the equality of the marginal product of capital across countries which
is generated by a free movement of capital. However, if the rax rate is
not the same in all countries, then the net returns accruing to savers
in different countries vary and the international allocation of world
savings is distorted.
According to the second principle, residents of a country are not
taxed on their income from foreign sources and foreigners are taxed
equally as residents on income from domestic sources. Now, suppose that
all countries adopt this principle. Then a resident of country H
earns in country F the same net return as the resident of country F
earns in country F. Since a resident in country H must earn the same
net return whether she channelled her savings to country H or to
country F, it follows that residents of all countries earn the same
net return. Thus, intertemporal marginal rate of substitution are
equated across countries, implying that the international allocation ofworld savings is efficient. flowever, if the tax rate is not the same in
all countries, then the marginal product of capital is also not the same
in all countries. In this case the international allocation of the
world stock of capital is not efficient.
Althoughthereare two extreme principles of international
taxation, in reality, countries adopt a mixture of the two polar
principles. Accordingly,in practice, countries partially tax
foreign-source income of residents and domestic-source income of
non-residents, in which case both the international allocations of world
savings and of world investments are distorted.
These issues are of particular relevance for Europe of 1992. The
creation of a single capital market in the European Community raises the
possibility of tax competition among the member countries, in the
absence of a full-fledged harmonization of the income tax systems.
Also, the possibilty of capital flight from the EC to low-tax countries
elsewhere has strong implications for the national tax structures in the
EC. These developments renewed the interest among public finance and
international finance economists in the issues of tax harmonization and
coordination, tax competition, the international structure of taxation,
etc. 2
Inthis paper we focus on the structure of taxation for countries
which are engaged in tax competiton and on the potential gains from tax
harmonization among them. Tax competition among countries obviously
raises the possibility of terms of trade manipulation. This issue,
however, has been exhaustively studied by now and we do not wish to
address it here any further. Ye are rather interested here inhighlighting the distortions and inefficiencies of the international
allocations of world savings and investments that are caused by capital
income taxation. Ve show that if the competing countriesare
sufficiently coordinated with the rest of the world so as to be able to
effectively tax their residents on their income from capital in the rest
of the world, then tax competition leads each country to apply the
residence principleof taxation and the equilibrium outcome is
efficient. Thus, there are no gains from tax harmonization.
If, however, there is not sufficient coordination with the rest of
the world to allow each country to tax its residents on their income
from capital in the rest of the world, then tax competition leads to no
tax whatsoever on capital income. All the tax burden falls in this case
on internationally immobile factors of producton, such as labor or land,
(more generally, it seems that the lower is the tax that can he
effectively levied on residents on income from capital in the rest of
the world, the lower would be the tax rate on income from capital from
sources within the competing countries.). The outcome in this case is
also efficient, relative to the constrained set of available tax
instruments. Thus, in this case too there are no gains from tax
harmonization.Naturally the outcome of tax competition in the case in
which the countries cannot tax their residents on capital income from
the rest of the world is welfare-inferior to the case where they can.
Thus, there are gains for the competing countries from tax coordination
with the rest of the world.5
2.A Stylized lodel of International TaxCompetition
International taxcompetition,or any fiscal policy competition for
that matter, has major efforts on the resource allocation across
countries as well as within each country. For example, the aggregate
(world-wide) level of savings as well as its cross-country composition
may be distorted by such competition; similarly, the aggregate level of
investment and its international allocation may become inefficient. In
general, these effects on resource allocation can be decomposed into two
elements. One concerns the indirect manipulation of the international
terms of trade by various fiscal measures (other than explicit trade
barriers such as tariffs and quotas) which is akin to the familiar
"trade wars." The second element which received less attention concerns
the international and domestic misallocation of resources that is
generated by taxcompetitionfor given terms of trade.
This paper focuses on the second of these two elements since the
first one has been exhaustively studied and has become by now a textbook
case. Ve therefore set up a stylized model in which tax competition
within the group of countries that we analyze cannot effect their terms
of trade. This is accomplished by assuming that this group of countries
is small relative to the rest of the world which effectively sets the
international terms of trade.
To simplify the exposition we assume that the competing group
consists of two small countries, denoted by superscripts H (for Home)
and F (for Foreign). An asterisk (*) stands for the rest of the
world. Suppose that all the countries agree on full integration of the
capital markets (as in Europe of 1992). That is, there exist totallyfree international movements of capital. There is also another factor,
labor, which is assumed to be immobile internationally.
Ve describe a representative (small) country, say country II.
Consider a stylized two-period model with one composite good, serving
both for (private and public) consumption and for investment. In the
first period the economy possesses an initial endowment of the
compositive good. Individuals can decide how much of their initial
endowments to consume in the first period and how much to save.Saving
is allocated to either domestic investment or foreign investments. In
the second period, output (produced by capital and labor) and income
from foreign investments are allocated between private and public
consumption. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that government
spending takes place in the second period. The government employs taxes
on labor, taxes on income from domestic investments, and possibly taxes
on income from investments abroad in order to finance optimally its
(public) consumption.
For simplicity, while still capturing basic real-world features, we
assume that government spending on public goods does not affect
individual demand patterns for private goods or the supply of labor.
That is, only the taxes that are needed to finance these expenditures
affect individual demands and supplies, but not the expenditures
themselves. Formally, this feature is obtained by assuming that the
utility function is weakly separable between private goods and services
on the one hand, and public goods and services, on the other hand. That
is, the representative individual in country H has a utilty function of
the form:7
(1) U11(c, 4, L1, G11) =u11(c,4, LH) +mH(Gll),
where uH and mH are the private and public components of the utility
function, respectively; 4, 4 and are first-period consumption,
second-period consumption and (second-period) laborsupply,
respectively; and G11 is (second-period) public consumption.
Denote saving in the form of domestic capital by S, saving
exported to country F by and saving exported to the rest of the
world by S .Thebudget constraint of the representative individual
(the private sector) in the first period is:
H HR HF H* H
(2) c1-s-S +S +S =1,
where 1H is a fixed endowment.
In the second period the private sector finances its consumption
from labor income which is taxed at the rate 4 and its capital income
which stems from one domestic source and two foreign sources, from
country F and from the rest of the world. The gross returns on
H F *
capitalincome from these sources are r ,rand r ,respectively.3
These sources may be taxed domestically and/or by the foreign countries.
Ve use the following notation for the rates of tax on capital income
imposed in country i (i =
(i) taD -thetax rate levied on domestic residents on their
domestic- source income,8
(ii) t -thetaxratelevied on domestic residents on their
foreign- source income,
(iii) tgD -thetax rate levied on non residents on their domestic
capital.
Thus, the private sector faces the following budget constraint in
the second period:
(3) c =(1-t)
wULK +S[1 + (1-tD)r11]
+511F[1+(1-4A)(1-tKD)r"]
+SH*[1+(l4A)r*],
where wK is the real wage rate (in terms of second-period
consumption).
Since a resident in country K is free to invest domestically, or in
country F, or anywhere else in the world, and assuming that in the
equilibria analyzed here she exercises this possibility of portfolio
diversification, then it must be the case that she earns the same net






















H HR HF H*
(6) S =S +S +5
is the aggregate saving of the private sector in country H. Now, the
budget constraints for the first and second periods ((2) and (5)) may be









are the present-value, (post-tax) consumer prices of second-period
consumption and labor, respectively.
Maximization of the utilty function (1) subject to the budget
constraint (7) yields the demand for private consumption in the first
period, the supply of saving in the second period, and the supply of
labor by the private sector in the second period respectively: c(q,10
qjil), 4(q, q, III), SH(q, q, jH) and L11(q, q, Is).
the indirect utility function is defined by:
1111 II 11 11
(8) v(q,q,I,G)=
u11(c(q, q, i) c(q, q, Ii), L11(q, q, 111)) +m11(G11).
This comprises the consumption-labor supply side of the economy.
Domestic output (Y11) of the composite consumption good in the
second-period is produced by capital (K11)and labor (LH),according
to a neo-classical, constant-returns-to-scale production function:
(9) =FH(KH,L11).
The stock of domestic capital is composed of the saving by domestic
residents channelled to domestic uses (S1111), the saving by the
residents of country F channelled to country II(Sfl) and saving by
the rest of the world channelled to country 11(S ).Thatis:
H HH FH IE
(10) K =S +S +S
H HF 11* FH *11 =S -[(S+S )- (S +S)J
whereuse is made of equation (6).Put differently, the domestic
capital stock is equal to aggregate domestic saving (S11) less net
capital exports (i.e., S +S -(S+S)).11
Themarginal productivity conditions determine the (pre-tax)
interest rate and the wage rate:




HRH H w =
FL(K
,L),
wherea subscripti denotes a partial derivative with respect to
variable i, i =K,L.
As usual, the equilibrium conditions (or resource constraints) in
country H require that supply demand for first-period consumption, and










HF H Note that S +S is the saving of the residents of country H which
is invested abroad and thus earns a social (i.e., before tax) return at
*
the rate of r ,nomatter whether invested in the rest of the world or
FR *H
in country F. The sumS + S is foreign saving invested in
country H. It earns the domestic rate of return rH, but the foreign12
residents can extract from country H only a net of tax return (1 -
tNRD)r,
because a tax tNRO (per unit) remains in country H.
Country F is similar to country H, so that the equations for
country F are exactly like those described above for country H, except
that the superscripts F and H are interchanged.
Of particular interest now are the rate-of-return arbitrage









Since (15a) and (15b) imply that (1 -tp)rH
=r,it follows upon
consolidation of the first-period and the second-period equilibrium
conditions for country H (i.e., equations (13) and (14),) that country H
faces the following future-value, life-time equilibrium condition:




II fl,HH II +I- I
HF Ht FH tH *
+[(S +S )-(S +S )]r,13
where use is made also of equation (10). This condition merely states
that total private and public consumption in the second-period (i.e.,
+c) must be equal to the sum of: (i) output generated by
domestic capital, which is financed by domestic saving (i.., c)
less net capital exports (i.e., gross capital exports, S +S ,less
FR ll
gross capital iports, S +S),andlabor; (ii) domestic capital;
and (iii) the return on net capital exports. Notice that by Vairas's
Law the government budget constraint in each country is automatically
satisfied at equilibrium.
The stylized model of international tax competition works as
follows. Each government designs its fiscal policy so as to maximize
the welfare of the representative resident. In so doing, it obviously
takes into account the equilibrium and arbitrage conditions set forth by
adherence to a market economy, and also takes as given the fiscal
instruments employed by the government in the other country. This leads
to a Nash-equilibrium between the two countries.
3. Tax Competition withEffective Enforcement of Taxeson Income from
the Lest of the Vorid.
Suppose that fiscal policies are not harmonized internationally, so.
that the two countries are engaged in taxcompetition.However, some
minimal degree of coordination among the two countries and the rest of
the world prevail, so that they can effectively tax, should they wish,
their residents on foreign-source income.
Inthiscase the government in country H,forinstance, chooses
G11,q,q, (Silk' +Sil*)-(SFH+s*H),ri',h tLD,tNRD and tRA14
soas to maximize the utility function (8), subject to the equilibrium
condition (16), the definition of q and q in (7a) and (7b)
respectively, and the relevant arbitrage conditions (4a) and (15b).
Notice that the other two arbitrage conditions (4b) and (15a), are
irrelevant for country 11 because they have no effect on its economy
(formally the endogenous variables in (4b) and (15a) appear nowhere else
in the equations describing the economy of country K). In addition, r11
and w11 are given bythe marginal productivity conditions (ii) and (12).
This optimization can be simplified a great deal by solving it in
two stages. First, choose public consumption (G11), consumer prices of
second-period consumption and labor (q andq, respectively) and net
capital exports (S +S -(S +S))soas to maximize the
indirect utilty function (8), subject to just one constraint: the
resource constraint (16).Then, in the second stage set r11 and w11
from (11) and (12), respectively; tD from (7a); t from (7b); 1NRD
from (15b) and tRA from (4a).
Carrying out the first stage of this optimization process it
follows (from the first-order condition for net capital exports) that
the marginal product of capital, F should be equal to the world rate
of interest r .SinceFK =r,by(11), we thus have:
(17) F =r11=r*.
This gross rate-of-return equalization (which, for the same reasons,
must hold also in country F) implies that physical capital must be
efficiently allocated among country K, country F and the rest of the15
world,even though we are at a second-best situation where many other
distortions exist both within and across countries (e.g.,the
saving- consumption tradeoffs, the consumption- leisure tradeoffs) .
Sincer =r,it follows from (15b) that tNRD =0.Also, (4a)
implies that tD =tRA.Thus, country H should not tax foreigners on
their income from capital in country U and it should tax its residents
uniformly on their capital income from all sources, domestic as well as
foreign. Naturally, a similar result holds for country F as well.
Thus, each country should employ the residence (or world-wide) principle
for the taxation of income from capital.
Now we shall address the issue of whether this tax competition
Nash-equilibrium is a second-best optimum (i.e., relative to the tax
policy tools). Or, can there be gains from concerted tax harmonization?
Consider, say, country H.Notice that in the optimization problem
carried out by the government of country H, the only variables that
pertain to country F s' s'11. However, country H is
indifferent between S and S and between S and S ,aslong
HF 11* FH *fl
as net capital exports, S +S -(S +S),stayconstant.
Therefore, country B can readjust capital exports with the rest of the
world in order to offset any fiscal policy that country F may implement.
That is, country F has no effect on country II; and vice versa. Thus,
there is nothing that can be gained from tax harmonization and tax
competition therefore leads to a second-best opti.u.16
4.Tax Competition without Enforceable Taxes on Income from the Rest
of the Vorld
In order to implement effectively a policy of taxing world-wide
income, a considerable degree of coordination among countries is
required, such as, for example, an exchange of information among the tax
authorities, withholding arrangements, loosening bank secrecy laws, etc.
Suppose now that countries F and H can reach such coordination which
enables each to effectively tax its residents on their income from
capital invested in the other country, even though they continue to
engage in tax competition. However, they cannot tax the income from
capitalinvested in the rest of the world, as they have no coordination
agreements. This seems a rather interesting and realistic case which
captures the essence of a problem hindering European integration, that
of capital moving to low-tax countries in the rest of the world.














Now, if there is an interior solution for capital invested by the
rest of the world in countries H and F, it must also be the case that1?
*






Then (18), (4b') and (15b') imply that
(19) tA =tLA
=
Thatis, when countries F and H cannot tax their residents on income
from capital invested in the rest of the world, then the rate-of-return
arbitrage prevents each one of them from taxing its residents on their
income from capital invested in the other country, even though their tax
authorities can cooperate on such things as tax withholding, etc. This
may explain why the EC dropped the idea of imposing a withholding tax on
capital income.
Ve now turn to the Nash-equilibrium resulting from tax competition
in this case. Consider one of the two competing countries, say country
H. As in the preceding section, the government in country H faces the
same optimization problem, except that constraints (4a')and (15b')
replace (4a) and (15b), respectively. Here too, it follows from the
first-order condition for net capital exports, that F =r.Since F
=r11,by (11), we thus have (with similar reasoning applying to country
F):
(20)F=r11=r=r=F.'a
Again, this equalization of the domestic productivity of capital in
country II (and in country F) to the world rate of interest generates a
world-wide efficient allocation of physical capital. From (4a') and
(15a') we then conlude that
(21) taD =tft0
=
Also,it follows from (19), (4b') and (15b') that
(22) tNRD =tNRD
=
Thatis, no capital income tax whatsoever is imposed by either country.
All of the tax burden falls on the internationally immobile factor, i.e.
labor. Again, as in the preceding section, it is straightforwarded to
show that the countries F and ft cannot gain anything from a concerted
tax harmonization. That is, tax competition is a comstrained optimum,
relative to the set of tax instruments that is available. Notice that
since this set is more restricted than that of the preceding section
(where taxes on income from sources in the rest of the world were
enforceable), then the constrained optimum in this case is inferior to
the second-best optimum o the preceding section.
In conclusion, when the two countries are not coordinated with the
rest of the world and cannot effectively tax their residents on their
income from capital invested in the rest of the world, then tax
competition leads to a full exemption from tax for the mobile factor
(i.e., capital), placing all the tax burden on the immobile factors,19
such as labor, land, etc. Furthermore no gains can be obtained from tax
harmonization.
5. Extensiom: Equity Considerations
We have dealt so far with a representative individual in each
country, thereby abstractingfromanyintra- countryequity
considerations. Nevertheless, while in general the size of government
and the structure of taxation depends on equity considerations, the
results obtained in the preceding sections do not. Specifically, the
optimality of the residence principle in the case where each country can
tax its residents on their capital income from the rest of the world,
the optimality of not taxing capital income in the case where it cannot
andthe redundancy of tax harmonization in both cases, all hold for many
consumer economies as well.
To see this, notice that with many consumers the indirect utility
function v11(q, q, 1H) of country H, for instance, is replaced by an
indirect social welfare function V'1(q, q, I,. .. ,I)whichdepends,
II
in addition to prices, also on the distribution of initial endowments
I,. .. ,Iamong the n11 consumers of country H. Similarly, each
H
individual demand or supply function is replaced by an aggregate demand
or supply function. [For example, the demand function for first-period
consumption of the representative individual in country H, namely
4(q, q, ii), is replaced by an aggregate demand function C(q, q,
'n = q, I), where c(.) is the demand function
of individual i; and so on. ]Itis straightforward to see that20
carrying out this extension alters none of the results of the preceding
sections.21
FOOTNOTES
A credit is given against taxes paid abroad on foreign- source
income in order to avoid double taxation.
2
See, for instance, Alworth (1988), Bovenberg (1988), Giovannini
(1988, 1989a, 198gb), Gordon (1986), tazin and Sadka (1988, 1989),
tazin and Slemrod (forthcoming), Sinn (1987) and Slemrod (1988).
Since the rest of the world is passive in this framework we denote
*
for simplicity by rthe world-rate of interest that accrues to
residents in countries 11 and F, after whatever taxes are withheld
by the rest of the world.
This result is essentially an open-economy variant of the aggregate
production efficiency theorem in optimal tax theory (e.g., Diamond
and Iirrlees (1971), Sadka (1977), and Dixit (1985).)22
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